Self-Perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena

A theory of self-perception is proposed to provide an alternative interpretation for several of the major phenomena embraced by Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance and to explicate some of the secondary patterns of data that have appeared in dissonance experiments. It is suggested that the attitude statements which comprise the major dependent variables in dissonance experiments may be regarded as interpersonal judgments in which the observer and the observed happen to be the same individual and that it is unnecessary to postulate an aversive motivational drive toward consistency to account for the attitude change phenomena observed. Supporting experiments are presented, and metatheoretical contrasts between the "radical " behavioral approach utilized and the phenomenological approach typified by dissonance theory are discussed

Feeling the future: A meta-analysis of 90 experiments on the anomalous anticipation of random future events

In 2011, one of the authors (DJB) published a report of nine experiments in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology purporting to demonstrate that an individual\u2019s cognitive and affective responses can be influenced by randomly selected stimulus events that do not occur until after his or her responses have already been made and recorded, a generalized variant of the phenomenon traditionally denoted by the term precognition. To encourage replications, all materials needed to conduct them were made available on request. We here report a meta-analysis of 90 experiments from 33 laboratories in 14 countries which yielded an overall effect greater than 6 sigma, z = 6.40, p = 1.2 7 10 with an effect size (Hedges\u2019 g) of 0.09. A Bayesian analysis yielded a Bayes Factor of 5.1 7 10 , greatly exceeding the criterion value of 100 for \u201cdecisive evidence\u201d in support of the experimental hypothesis. When DJB\u2019s original experiments are excluded, the combined effect size for replications by independent investigators is 0.06, z = 4.16, p = 1.1 7 10 , and the BF value is 3,853, again exceeding the criterion for \u201cdecisive evidence.\u201d The number of potentially unretrieved experiments required to reduce the overall effect size of the complete database to a trivial value of 0.01 is 544, and seven of eight additional statistical tests support the conclusion that the database is not significantly compromised by either selection bias or by intense \u201cp -hacking\u201d\u2014the selective suppression of findings or analyses that failed to yield statistical significance. P-curve analysis, a recently introduced statistical technique, estimates the true effect size of the experiments to be 0.20 for the complete database and 0.24 for the independent replications, virtually identical to the effect size of DJB\u2019s original experiments (0.22) and the closely related \u201cpresentiment\u201d experiments (0.21). We discuss the controversial status of precognition and other anomalous effects collectively known as psi

Group Influence On Individual Risk Taking 1

Does group interaction lead to greater conservatism or to greater risk taking in decisions than would obtain were the decisions arrived at individually.–or is there an averaging effect? This question was investigated with a procedure in which the protagonist in each of 12 everyday life situations must choose between two courses of action, one of which involves considerably more risk than the other but also is much more rewarding if successful. The S must decide on the lowest level of probability for the success of the risky alternative that he would deem sufficient to warrant its choice. A total of 218 liberal arts university students participated in the study. In the experimental condition, the S s first arrived at individual decisions concerning each of the 12 situations; then, they were brought together in discussion groups of six with the request that they reach a group consensus on each decision; and afterward, they were asked to make all their decisions privately once again. Some S s also made private decisions yet another time two to six weeks later. The group members' judgments of one another's relative degrees of influence and of popularity within the group also were obtained. There were 14 all‐male and 14 all‐female groups. In the control condition, S s made their decisions individually each of two times with one week intervening, under instructions the second time that encouraged them to change rather than simply to recall their earlier decisions. It was found that (1) group decisions exhibit greater risk taking than appears in pre‐discussion individual decisions; (2) post‐discussion private decisions exhibit the same increase in risk taking as occurs in the group decisions; (3) the increase in risk taking resulting from the discussion process is still maintained after a subsequent period of two to six weeks has elapsed; (4) no shift in risk taking level occurs over time in the absence of the discussion process; and (5) degree of risk taking in pre‐discussion individual decisions and degree of judged influence within the group are positively related. Two interpretations of these findings were suggested, either or both of which may apply: (1) the knowledge that one's decisions are being made jointly with others leads to a diffusion of personal responsiblity, the outcome of which is an increased willingness to take risks; (2) high risk takers are more likely to take the initiative in social situations, with the result that they become more influential in the group.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/108371/1/ets200112.pd

Two Replication Studies of a Time-Reversed (Psi) Priming Task and the Role of Expectancy in Reaction Times

Two experiments involving an international collaboration ofexperimenters sought to replicate and extend a previously publishedpsi experiment on precognition by Daryl Bem that has been the focusof extensive research. The experiment reverses the usual cause–e! ectsequence of a standard psychology experiment using priming and reactiontimes. The preregistered con" rmatory hypothesis is that response timesto incongruent stimuli will be longer than response times to congruentstimuli even though the prime has not yet appeared when the participantrecords their judgments. The con" rmatory hypothesis for Experiment 1was not supported. Exploratory analyses indicated that those participantswho completed the English-language version rather than a translationshowed a signi" cant e! ect, as was the case in the original study; nosigni" cant departure from chance was found in data involving non-English translations. Experiment 2 sought to enhance the predicted e! ectby having each participant read either a pro-psi or an anti-psi statementat the beginning of the experiment to test the hypothesis that a pro-psistatement would produce a larger e! ect than an anti-psi statement. Theresults did not support the primary psi hypothesis and there was no e! ectin the English-language sample. However, there was mixed support forthe e! ect of the psi statement on performance; those participants whoreceived the pro-psi statement had a greater psi score than those whoreceived the anti-psi statement. As in the original experiment, neitherthe experimenters’ nor participants’ beliefs were consistently associatedwith the dependent measure. In sum, the pre-registered con" rmatoryhypotheses were not supported. The importance of the personalityvariable Sensation Seeking, a component of extraversion, as a correlateof psi performance is discussed as are the challenges and implicationsfor international collaborations and replication in controversial science

Two Replication Studies of a Time-Reversed (Psi) Priming Task and the Role of Expectancy in Reaction Times

Two experiments involving an international collaboration of experimenters sought to replicate and extend a previously published psi experiment on precognition by Daryl Bem that has been the focus of extensive research. The experiment reverses the usual cause–effect sequence of a standard psychology experiment using priming and reaction times. The preregistered confirmatory hypothesis is that response times to incongruent stimuli will be longer than response times to congruent stimuli even though the prime has not yet appeared when the participant records their judgments. The confirmatory hypothesis for Experiment 1 was not supported. Exploratory analyses indicated that those participants who completed the English-language version rather than a translation showed a significant effect, as was the case in the original study; no significant departure from chance was found in data involving non- English translations. Experiment 2 sought to enhance the predicted effect by having each participant read either a pro-psi or an anti-psi statement at the beginning of the experiment to test the hypothesis that a pro-psi statement would produce a larger effect than an anti-psi statement. The results did not support the primary psi hypothesis and there was no effect in the English-language sample. However, there was mixed support for the effect of the psi statement on performance; those participants who received the pro-psi statement had a greater psi score than those who received the anti-psi statement. As in the original experiment, neither the experimenters’ nor participants’ beliefs were consistently associated with the dependent measure. In sum, the pre-registered confirmatory hypotheses were not supported. The importance of the personality variable Sensation Seeking, a component of extraversion, as a correlate of psi performance is discussed as are the challenges and implications for international collaborations and replication in controversial science